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I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)' and the Securities Ex-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author thanks
his colleagues, Professors Clifford Calhoun, Homer Clark, and Ted Fiflis for their helpful
comments and suggestions in the preparation of this article.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (1976).
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change Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)2 contain eight different sections
that afford express causes of action to private parties.3 The federal
courts have also found private rights of action for the benefit of persons
injured by violations of several other sections, principally sections
10(b) 4 and 14(a) 5 and 14(e)6 of the Exchange Act. In the private action
sections in which it is likely that Congress envisioned multiple defend-
ants, Congress, with two exceptions, provided for an express right of
contribution.7 Consequently, the federal courts have almost uniformly
found a right to contribution when the underlying cause of action was
itself an implied private action.8 Moreover, as liability under sections
2. 15 U.S.C. §§78a-78kk (1976).
3. The provisions of the Securities Act expressly authorizing private causes of action are:
section 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976); section 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976); section 12(2), 15
U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976); and section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). The provisions of the Exchange Act
expressly authorizing such actions are: section 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976); section 16(b), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976); section 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976); and section 20(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a) (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (prohibiting the use of manipulative or deceptive devices or
contrivances in connection with the purchase or sale of any security). See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976) (prohibiting the solicitation of proxies by means of false or
misleading statements or omissions). See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) (prohibiting material misrepresentations or omissions and
fraud, deception and manipulation in connection with a tender offer). See Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 55 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); O'Connor Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
7. In section Il(f) of the Securities Act and in sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the Exchange Act,
all of which contemplate multiple defendants, Congress included the right to contribution. In
section 15 of the Securities Act and section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, which also contemplated
multiple defendants, Congress omitted the right to contribution. See notes 58-64 infra and accom-
panying text.
8. Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1982) (rule lOb-5); Huddleston v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, mod/fed, 650 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct.
1766 (1982) (rule 1Ob-5); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (rule lOb-5); McLean
v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979) (rule lOb-5); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Securi-
ties Act § 17(a)); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976) (Exchange Act § 14(a)); Globus, Inc. v. Law Re-
search Serv. (Globus I1), 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968),
modfed on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970) (rule lOb-5). But see State Mut. Life
Assurance Co. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Peat, Marwick
was subsequently rejected in Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp.
112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd in part and rev'd in part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); and Shea v.
Ungar, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,558 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Shea
denied contribution but has not been cited in any subsequent decision. The District Court for the
Southern District of New York recently certified to the Second Circuit, on an interlocutory appeal,
the question of whether in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981) and Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630 (1981) a private right of action could still be found under the federal securities law.
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12(1)9 and 12(2)10 of the Securities Act has been expanded by the courts
to include multiple defendants, the federal courts have also found an
implied right to contribution in actions based on those sections."
A federal district court decision in 1968, deHaas v. Empire Petro-
leum Co. ,12 was the first decision by a federal court allowing a right to
contribution under the federal securities laws.13 The deHaas case arose
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule lOb-5;14 other courts
soon followed deHaas, allowing a right to contribution under other sec-
tions of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.' 5 During this
period, there was little critical comment, either from the courts or legal
scholars, on the propriety of allowing a right to contribution under
these various provisions, 16 even though the deHaas decision departed
from the only other case that had passed on the availability of contribu-
tion under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.17 While the courts have recog-
nized a right to contribution under several sections of both Acts.
Certain sections of the Acts, however, more readily lend themselves to
Noonan v. Granville-Smith 535 F.Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The district court had earlier con-
cluded that it could. Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 532 F.Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(l) (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(2) (1976).
11. See, e.g., Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1362, 1365-71 (D. Md. 1975) (permit-
ting contribution under section 12(l)), aft'd, 542 F.2d 1235, 1236 (4th Cir. 1976); Odette v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (permitting contribution under
section 12(2)).
12. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968).
13. Id. at 815-16.
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
15. See cases cited in notes 8 and 11 supra.
16. Several subsequent articles have discussed contribution under the federal securities laws.
See, e.g., Adamski, Contribution and Settlement in Multoarty Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 66 IowA
L. REv. 533 (1981); Fischer, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821 (1978); Ruder,
Multiple Defendants In Securities Law Fraud Cases Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari
Delicto, IndemnPfcation and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 647-51 (1972). Note,Apportion-
ing Contribution Shares Under the Federal Securities Acts: A SuggestedApproachfor an Unsettled
Area, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 450 (1981); Note, Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1256 (1975). These articles, however, explore various aspects of the right to
contribution, generally accepting the reasoning of the courts establishing the right.
17. Shea v. Ungar, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RaP. (CCH) 91,558 (S.D.N.Y.
1965).
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the implication of contribution than other sections.'8 Although thirteen
years have passed since deHaas was decided, several recent develop-
ments make a contemporary analysis of that decision and its progeny
timely.
In two recent decisions the United States Supreme Court has de-
nied an implied right to contribution. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Transport Workers Union,19 the Court refused to find a right to contri-
bution in favor of an employee against a union where the employer's
liability was based on the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In a case decided one month later, Texas
Industries v. Radclf'f Materials, Inc. ,20 the Court denied contribution
among antitrust defendants in a case arising under the federal antitrust
laws. In each of these cases, the Court reviewed statutes that provided
express causes of action for their violation, but no express right to con-
tribution. These decisions should apply to the implication of a right to
contribution under section 15 of the Securities Act2' and section 20(a)
of the Exchange Act 22 because those sections create express causes of
action, yet omit a right to contribution. The Court's recent decisions
also may be relevant to the implication of a right to contribution under
rule 10b-5 and the other implied liability provisions because the Court
dealt explicitly with the legal process of inferring a right to
contribution.
A second development is the Supreme Court's recent tendency to
limit implied causes of action. As the Court recognized in Northwest
Airlines and Texas Industries,23 inferring a right to contribution is tan-
tamount to recognizing a new implied cause of action and, therefore, is
18. See text accompanying notes 155-72 infra.
19. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
20. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). This section provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or more other
persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable
under section 11 or 12, shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is
alleged to exist.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). This section provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provi-
sion of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and
severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom
such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did
not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of
action.
23. See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634-46 (1981); Northwest Air-
lines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91-99 (1981).
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beyond the power of the federal courts except in very limited circum-
stances. 24 The cases that developed this line of reasoning, starting with
Cort v. Ash25 in 1974, were decided after most of the principal decisions
finding an implied right to contribution under various sections of fed-
eral securities laws. Moreover, an analysis of Supreme Court cases that
refuse to infer a cause of action leads to the conclusion that the Court
today would find no private cause of action under rule lOb-5. 26 It is
appropriate, therefore, to examine what effect, if any, Cort v. Ash and
its progeny have on the securities law contribution cases.
A final development prompting an examination of the federal
courts' implication of a right to contribution under the securities laws is
the restrictive manner in which the Court has interpreted the liability
sections of the securities laws. In a series of decisions starting with Blue
Chp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,27 the Court admonished the lower
federal courts to pay greater attention to legislative intent, as reflected
in the statutory language and legislative history, when interpreting the
securities laws. In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,28 for instance, the
Court refused to read section 10(b) of the Exchange Act as creating a
federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. These restrictive
rules of interpretation may affect the power of the federal courts to per-
mit contribution under the federal securities laws.
24. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 645-46; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 94.
25. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See also notes 100-105 infra and accompanying text. Numerous arti-
cles have analyzed these cases. See generally Frankel, Implied Rights ofA4cion, 67 VA. L. REV.
553 (1981), and sources referred to therein.
26. Under the Court's recent cases, finding an implied a private right of action is a matter of
statutory construction, and the sole issue is whether Congress, in enacting the statute, intended to
authorize the private remedy being sought. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 568 (1979) (refusing to find a private right of action under section 17(a) of the Exchange Act).
The implied private remedy under rule lOb-5 has never been justified on the basis of congressional
intent. The Supreme Court acquiesced in the lower federal courts' decisions finding an implied
private remedy because the lower courts had developed an extensive jurisprudence under rule
lob-5 for almost three decades before the Court announced its decisions limiting implied private
actions under federal statutes. Id. at 577 n.19. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 690 n.13 (1979). See generalo Frankel, supra note 25, at 562.
27. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Subsequent decisions applying this analysis include: Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 695-700 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980); Sante Fe Indus.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201-14 (1976).
28. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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II. IMPLIED CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
A. A Synopsis.
Predictably, in view of the amount of litigation in the 1960s and
1970s based on rule lOb-5 and other provisions of the securities laws,
and the increased potential for higher damage awards, defendants have
sought to mitigate their losses either by filing cross-claims against one
another for contribution or by adding third-party defendants to the liti-
gation as a source for contribution in any damage award. In Shea v.
Ungar,29 the first reported case to rule on the availability of contribu-
tion under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the defendant, who allegedly
had violated section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act, filed a third-party complaint for contri-
bution. The court dismissed the third-party complaint apparently be-
cause it found no right to contribution under section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, under section 10(b), or rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act,
or under the substantive law of New York.30
The District Court for the District of Colorado in its 1968 decision,
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co. ,31 did not follow or cite Shea. In de-
Haas the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants obtained their consent
to a corporate merger by the use of false and misleading proxy materi-
als in violation of rule lOb-5. The defendants filed a third-party com-
plaint for indemnification and contribution against their attorney,
claiming that it was his duty to make the proper disclosures in the
proxy materials. The court refused to dismiss the third-party complaint
for contribution, reasoning that because the express liability provisions
of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act provide for contribution,
contribution should be permitted when the underlying cause of action
is an implied cause of action, as it is under section 10(b) of the Ex-
29. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,558 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). It is
possible that the defendant argued that contribution should be allowed. The court did, however,
look at the availability of contribution under the substantive law of New York. Presumably, if the
court had found that "active joint tortfeasors" were entitled to contribution under New York law,
it would have found an implied a right under federal law.
30. Id. The court analyzed the issue in terms of an improper joinder. The court reasoned
that under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a defendant may, as a third-party
plaintiff, bring in as a third-party defendant a person who "is or may be liable" to the third-party
plaintiff for all or part of plaintiff's claim against him. Indemnity would have been available in
Shea only if the third-party plaintiff had a right to contribution against the third-party defendant.
The court did not say that there was no right to contribution; rather it said that neither the Securi-
ties Act nor the Exchange Act "creates a right to joinder under Rule 14 applicable to this case
.... " Id. The court did not explain why the presence or absence of a right to contribution under
New York law should influence the outcome of the case. See note 29 supra.
31. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968).
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change Act.32
Two years after the decision in deHaas, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in a decision by Judge Frankel, or-
dered contribution in a case involving sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the
Securities Act and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.33 In Globus, Inc.
v. Law Research Service (Globus 11) 34 the court ordered two defendants
to reimburse a third defendant for a pro rata portion of the judgment
paid by that third defendant to the plaintiff. Judge Frankel reasoned
that the trend of the law was toward the allowance of contribution
among joint tortfeasors, and that denying contribution would dilute the
deterrent impact of the securities laws.35 The court did not explain how
a denial of contribution would dilute deterrence, except to say that de-
nying contribution would permit the two nonpaying defendants in this
case to "effectively nullify" their liability for compensatory damages. 36
For this reason, the court pointed out, the decision in Globus J37 denied
one defendant the right to enforce a claim for contractual indemnity
against another defendant. 38 The court in Globus I reasoned that if a
party could enforce a contractual right to indemnification, it could
avoid liability for its wrongful conduct, and that party's incentive to
comply with the securities laws would be reduced. 39
Thus, the courts in deHaas and Globus II gave three reasons for
allowing contribution: the analogy to the express liability provisions of
the securities acts, the trend of the law, and the deterrent effect. A
fourth rationale, relied upon by several courts, is fairness.40 The courts
have reasoned that when one or more joint wrongdoers pay more than
their share of a common burden, the other wrongdoers are unjustly
32. Id. at 816. The court also cited Professor Loss' treatise as authority for its decision. See
id, citing III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1739 n.178 (2d ed. 1961).
33. Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv. (Globus I1), 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 957-58.
36. Id. at 958.
37. Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv. (Globus 1), 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modi-
fiedin part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
38. Indemnity shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor who has been compelled to pay it to
another who should bear it instead. By comparison, contribution distributes the loss among the
tortfeasors by requiring each to pay his proportionate share. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS
§ 50, at 310 (4th ed. 1971).
39. See, e.g., Globus 1, 418 F.2d at 1289.
40. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 559 (5th Cir.), modified, 615
F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982) ("We conclude that a rule permitting
contribution provides an equitable result that sufficiently satisfies the objective of deterrence
under the securities laws."); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp. 1251, 1266 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don
other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[Flundamental fairness demands a sharing by
wrongdoers in setting the wrong right.")
549Vol. 1982:543]
DUKE LAW JOURAL
enriched. Such a result presumably lacks justice and, therefore, cannot
be tolerated by the courts. While the fairness rationale is in part re-
sponsible for the trend in the law favoring contribution, it is conve-
nient, for purposes of discussion, to treat the two rationales
independently.
The court in Globus II did not consider whether the resolution of
the contribution issue would differ depending on which section of the
securities laws was the basis for the plaintiffs recovery. The complaint
in Globus II named several different sections; none provided for contri-
bution.41 The court proceeded, however, as though it made no differ-
ence which sections were involved. Because rule lOb-5 has developed
into the principal liability section under the securities laws, this article
will proceed first with an examination of the four rationales for al-
lowing contribution as they apply to private actions brought under that
rule. Closer examination of these rationales will show that they are not
entirely persuasive, in part because of a change in the way the courts
have interpreted rule lOb-5, and in part because the fairness and deter-
rence rationales may not require that contribution be allowed.
B. The First Rationale - Analogy to Express Liability Provisions.
Under the Exchange Act and the Securities Act, which the courts
construe in pari materia,42 eight provisions expressly grant a private
cause of action for damages.43 Only three of these provisions contain a
right to contribution.44 Sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities Act,
which grant express rights of action in favor of purchasers of securities
against any person who sold the security in violation of the registration
provisions45 and against any person who sold a security by means of a
false or misleading prospectus or oral communication, contain no right
to contribution.46 Section 15 of the Securities Act and section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, which, in similar language, impose joint and several
liability on "controlling persons" for any civil liability assessed against
the persons controlled by them, contain no right to contribution.47 Fi-
41. See 318 F. Supp. at 956-57.
42. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976). See generally 5 A. JAcoBs,
THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 § 7, 1-153 & n.21 (1980) and cases cited therein.
43. See note 3 supra.
44. The three provisions that include a right to contribution are section 1 (f) of the Securities
Act and sections 9(e) and 18(b) of the Exchange Act. See notes 54-57 infra and accompanying
text.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1) (1976).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1976).
47. These sections are set out in full in notes 21 and 22 supra.
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nally, section 16(b) of the Exchange Act,48 which grants a cause of ac-
tion to the issuer of a security against its own officers, directors, and ten
percent owners for any short-swing profits these individuals realize by
trading the issuer's securities, also fails to provide for contribution. The
absence of a contribution provision is understandable in sections 12(1)
and 12(2); Congress probably assumed that only one person could be
liable for a violation of those provisions since the language of those
sections imposes liability on any person who sells a security in violation
of the sections "to the person purchasing such security from him .,49
Similarly, the defendant in an action brought under section 16(b) of the
Exchange Act stands liable to the issuer only for "any profit realized by
him from any purchase and sale." It seems clear that Congress thought
a right to contribution unnecessary in either of those sections.50
By comparison, the controlling person provisions clearly contem-
plated liability for at least two persons whenever a claim was made
under those provisions because controlling persons are 'jointly and
severally" liable with and to the same extent as the controlled person.
Despite the inclusion of joint and several liability in the controlling
person sections, these sections do not mention contribution. The omis-
sion is not easily explained.5' Because Congress did not uniformly pro-
vide the right to contribution in all situations where multiple
defendants are possible, the analogy rationale must be closely ex-
amined. In particular, it is important to determine if liability under
section 10(b) is sufficiently similar to liability under the express liability
provisions which allow contribution to infer that Congress would have
included a right to contribution in section 10(b) had it made section
10(b) an express liability provision; or, alternatively, whether section
10(b) bears enough similarity to the controlling person provisions to
justify judicial denial of a right to contribution under section 10(b).
The Supreme Court has held that scienter is required to establish
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976) (emphasis added). The courts have found multiple parties liable
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act either for aiding and abetting, see, e.g., In re Caesar's
Palace SEC Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); or on a participation theory, see,
e.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (4th Cir. 1978). See also Croy v. Campbell, 624
F.2d 709, 714 (5th Cir. 1980).
50. See L. Loss, supra note 32, at 1739 n.178.
51. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal SecuritiesAct of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171 (1933). The
authors conclude that defendants liable under § 15 of the Securities Act are not entitled to contri-
bution under § 11 (f). Id at 179. The omission of a right to contribution in the controlling person
provisions may be explained by other forms of relief that exist for a controlled or controlling
person who is required to pay the entire judgment.
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liability under section 10(b). 52 That is, the defendant must have acted
with an intent to defraud. Because common law courts have tradition-
ally been unwilling to provide a right to contribution when the defend-
ant seeking contribution committed an intentional tort or acted
recklessly, 53 the federal courts should be reluctant to find a right to
contribution under rule lOb-5 unless allowing contribution would ad-
vance the purposes of the Exchange Act.
1. The Express Liability Provisions With a Right to Contribution.
The express liability provisions of the securities laws that include a
right to contribution are section 11(a) of the Securities Act, which
grants a cause of action to persons who purchase securities covered by a
false or misleading registration statement; and sections 9(e) and 18(a)
of the Exchange Act, which, respectively, provide causes of action on
behalf of persons damaged by a manipulation of securities prices and
by misleading statements in documents filed with the SEC.
The contribution provisions contained in each of these sections are
similar to one another. For instance, the right to contribution set forth
in section 11(f), which applies to actions based on section 11(a),
provides:
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a)
shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes
liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribu-
tion as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately,
would have been liable to make the same payment, unless the person
who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of fraudu-
lent misrepresentation. 54
The contribution provisions applicable to sections 9(e) and 18(a) do not
include the clause beginning with the word "unless." In other respects
52. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975). The Court defined "scienter" as "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. The Court
expressly left undecided the question of whether reckless behavior is sufficient to impose civil
liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. The courts of appeals that have ruled on this
question have decided that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement of Hochfelder. See, e.g.,
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d
945, 979 (5th Cir. 1981); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978). Given its narrowest reading, Hochfelder holds that a defendant who is merely negli-
gent does not have the mental state required to violate section 10(b) and rule lob-5. This article
uses scienter in that sense: a mental state embracing something more than simple negligence. See
generally Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. REv. 562 (1972).
53. See W. PROSSER, supra note 38, § 50, at 308 n.67. See also, Comment, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 Tax. L. REv. 326, 330 n.26 (1965).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976).
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they are substantially the same as section 11(f). 55
An examination of section 11 (f) discloses that the section does not
necessarily preclude defendants guilty of fraudulent conduct from ob-
taining contribution. The "unless" clause of that section precludes con-
tribution in favor of a party guilty of fraud from a party innocent of
fraud. Presumably, a party guilty of a fraudulent misrepresentation
could obtain contribution from another party who was also guilty of a
fraudulent misrepresentation. The contribution provisions in sections
9(e) and 18(a) of the Exchange Act do not include any limitation on
who may recover contribution thereunder. Apparently, Congress did
not intend to limit the contribution right of a defendant whose viola-
tion of those sections also included an element of scienter. Moreover,
under sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the Exchange Act, a plaintiff must
prove that the defendant was guilty of something more than ordinary
negligence, 56 and under all three sections fraudulent conduct may be a
basis for suit. Therefore, contribution ought not to be denied under
rule lOb-5 actions merely because it contemplates a finding of scienter,
unless an implied limitation on contribution among parties who acted
with scienter is read into the contribution clauses of the express liability
provisions. Such a limitation would be inconsistent, however, with the
language of section I I(f) of the Securities Act, which implies that con-
tribution is available among parties guilty of fraud. Moreover, the lim-
itation would eliminate contribution in many actions brought under
sections 9(e) and 18(a), because the proof required to establish a viola-
tion of those sections borders on proof of fraud.57 Finally, there is no
55. The applicable portion of section 9(e) provides: "Every person who becomes liable to
make any payment under this subsection may recover contribution as in cases of contract from
any person who, ifjoined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment."
15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
The contribution section applicable to section 18(a) provides: "Every person who becomes
liable to make payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of contract from
any person who, ifjoined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment."
15 U.S.C. 78r(b)(1976).
56. Section 9(e) creates potential civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in
the manipulation of securities on a national securities exchange. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976). Sec-
tion 18(a) creates potential civil liability for filing misleading statements with the SEC, but pro-
vides a defendant with the defense that "he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such
statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). The Court noted in Hochfelder
that each of the Exchange Act provisions other than section 16(b) "contains a state-of-mind condi-
tion requiring something more than negligence." 425 U.S. at 209 n.28. See also, L. Loss, supra
note 32, at 1748, where the author, commenting on section 9(e), notes that while section 9(e) does
not require proof of scienter, "it contains a causation requirement which is probably stricter than
the burden the plaintiff would face in a common law deceit action based on the defendant's ma-
nipulation." Loss also refers to plaintifi's burden of proof under section 18(a) as "a first cousin to
sc/enter." Id. at 1752.
57. See authorities cited in note 56 supra.
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basis in the language of the various sections or in the legislative history
for limiting the right to contribution only to those not guilty of fraud.
Not surprisingly, no reported decision has so limited the express contri-
bution provisions.
2. The Controlling Person Provisions. The Securities Act and the
Exchange Act each include provisions imposing civil liability on per-
sons who control other persons found liable under other sections of
each act,58 and each act includes a defense for the controlling person.
Under section 15 of the Securities Act, the controlling person avoids
liability if he "had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the con-
trolled person is alleged to exist." 59 To avoid liability under section
20(a) of the Exchange Act, the controlling person must demonstrate
that he "acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce
the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action." 60 The ex-
culpatory language in the controlling person provisions is similar to the
exculpatory language of section 18(a) of the Exchange Act, which re-
lieves a person from liability for false or misleading statements in docu-
ments filed with the SEC if that person proves "that he acted in good
faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or mislead-
ing." 61 Thus, if the available defenses are considered, the controlling
person provisions, like the other express liability provisions of the se-
curities laws, impose a burden of proof on plaintiffs that approaches
proof of scienter and exceeds negligence as the required state of mind.62
Because each of the express liability provisions requires that the de-
fendant be something more than negligent to be liable, and because
some of those provisions include a right to contribution while others do
not, it is unclear whether a right to contribution in section 10(b) should
be inferred. Thus, the analogy rationale is not a sound basis for per-
58. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t(a) (1976). See notes 21 and 22 supra for the texts of these
provisions.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
62. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976). See also, G. A. Thomp-
son & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d
388,394 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979) ("The controlling persons provisions contain a
state-of-mind condition that requires a showing of something more than negligence to establish
liability."); Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1315 (E.D. Va. 1981) (not-
ing that the difference between section 10(b) and section 20(a) "is the placement of the burden of
proof as to the defendant's state of mind.").
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mitting contribution in rule lOb-5 cases.63
C. The Second Rationale - The Trend in the Law.
The court in Globus II stated that "the general drift of the law
today is toward the allowance of contribution among joint tortfeasors"
and that this drift constitutes a departure from "the rugged flintiness of
traditional common law."64 The court cited ten decisions--three from
the federal courts and seven from the state courts-in support of its
statement. The court failed to note, however, that each of the decisions
applying state law involved contribution among tortfeasors whose joint
liability was based on negligence; no trend allowing contribution
among tortfeasors whose conduct was intentional, reckless, or fraudu-
lent was identified.
The American common law of contribution finds its origins in the
English case Merryweather v. Nixan,65 in which Lord Kenyon held that
there was no right to contribution when both tortfeasors had committed
an intentional tort. Early American courts applying this decision also
denied contribution among tortfeasors guilty only of negligence. 6
Early in this century, however, some state courts began to recognize a
right to contribution among negligent tortfeasors.67 At about that time,
the American Law Institute proposed a Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act and several states adopted it or other legislation modi-
fying the common law to permit contribution among joint tortfeasors.68
Although the Uniform Act, which provided for a right to contribution
among joint tortfeasors, did not differentiate between negligent and
non-negligent torts, the statutes adopted by some states did deny con-
tribution to intentional tortfeasors69 and few decisions allowed contri-
bution among intentional tortfeasors.70 Furthermore, the revised
63. In McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824, 835-36 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961), the court concluded that the securities laws "do not manifest sufficiently clear or uniform
policy favoring security for expenses" to justify imposing such a limitation from section 10(b).
The court noted that although sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act and 9(e) and 18(a) of the
Exchange Act each contain such a requirement, sections 16(b) and 29(b) of the Exchange Act do
not.
64. 318 F.Supp. at 957.
65. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). See generally Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly
Charged with Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. Rnv. 176 (1898).
66. See W. PROSSER, supra note 38, § 50 at 306.
67. Id. at 307.
68. Id. By 1959 roughly one-half of American jurisdictions permitted some form of contri-
bution among joint tortfeasors, either by judicial decision or by statute. See Comment, Adjusting
Losses Among Joint Tort/easors in Vehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE L. J. 964, 981-82 (1959).
69. See, eg., KY. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1970); VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977 Repl. Vol.).
70. See W. PROSSER, supra note 38, § 50 at 308. See also Comment, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEx. L. REv. 326, 329-30 (1965).
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Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which was approved in
1955 and was in existence at the time the district court decided Globus
I, retained contribution for negligent tortfeasors but included a sec-
tion denying intentional tortfeasors the right to contribution.71 Thus,
while there has certainly been a trend in this century favoring contribu-
tion, this trend has been generally limited to negligent torts. Parties
guilty of more serious culpability, such as reckless, intentional, or
fraudulent conduct, generally have not been entitled to contribution.
72
Although Globus II was decided in the pre-Hochfelder era, when
several federal circuits did not require proof of scienter in an action
based on rule lOb-5,7 3 the jury in Globus I found the defendants who
would later litigate the contribution question guilty of fraudulent con-
duct sufficiently egregious to justify an award of punitive damages.7 4
Moreover, defendants in rule lOb-5 actions must now be shown to have
acted with scienter, which apparently means acting with an intent to
defraud or, in some circuits, with recklessness.75 In either case, such
defendants ought not be treated as tortfeasors guilty of simple negli-
gence; therefore, the trend of the state courts to allow contribution in
negligence cases is not now a valid rationale even if it was in 1970 when
Globus II was decided.
D. The Third Rationale - Deterrence.
In justifying contribution, the court in Globus !1 relied partially on
Judge Mansfield's decision in Globus I, which denied contractual in-
deniification against an issuer of securities in favor of an under-
writer.76 Judge Mansfield reasoned that the purpose of the federal
securities laws is to ensure that investors will benefit from a thorough
71. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS (1955 Revised Act) § l(c) provides:
"There is no right to contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally.., caused or
contributed to the injury .. " The Uniform Act, or variations thereof, has been adopted in 19
states. 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 44 (Supp. 1981). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A(3) (1977), which also denies a right to contribution in favor of intentional
tortfeasors and tortfeasors guilty of reckless conduct. Similarly, the Commissioner's comment to
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act points out that "[t]he Act does not include intentional torts."
12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED, Comment to § 1 (1980 Supp.).
72. Parties guilty of reckless, intentional, or fraudulent conduct would be acting with scienter
as defined in this article. See note 52 supra.
73. See, eg., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur, 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961). See generally
Bucklo, supra note 52.
74. 287 F. Supp. at 194.
75. See note 52 supra.
76. 287 F. Supp. at 199.
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investigation by the underwriters of the facts set forth in a prospectus
or offering circular. Accordingly:
[i]f an underwriter were to be permitted to escape liability for its own
misconduct by obtaining indemnity from the issuers, it would have
less of an incentive to conduct a thorough investigation and to be
truthful in the prospectus distributed under its name, than it would
be if the indemnity was enforceable under such circumstances. 77
Judge Frankel in Globus II correctly viewed indemnity as a means
for avoiding liability, but went on to hold that denying contribution
would suffer from the same vice, because parties who escaped the obli-
gation to make a payment in contribution would "nullify their 'liability
for compensatory damages'. . .. ,,"8 The court, however, failed to dis-
cuss the large difference between permitting contractual indemnifica-
tion and denying a right to contribution: a party with an enforceable
contractual right to indemnity may well be lax in fulfilling his obliga-
tions under the securities laws because he knows in advance that he can
always deflect any loss to his indemnitor, but a party who knows he
may have to bear all of the damages arising from a securities law viola-
tion because contribution will not be available may well have an incen-
tive to exercise extreme diligence. One recent economic analysis by
Professors Easterbrook, Landes, and Posner concludes that a no-contri-
bution rule and a contribution rule yield the same deterrent effect on
antitrust conspirators.79 Further, if a conspirator is "risk averse," that
is, if he would prefer a greater chance of a small loss to a smaller
chance of a greater loss, a rule of no-contribution will provide greater
deterrence than a rule of contribution.80 This analysis should apply to
potential securities laws violators as well.
While this analysis may not be definitive, it does suggest a re-ex-
amination of Judge Frankers decision in order to determine how he
reached his conclusion on the deterrence issue. He did so, it appears,
solely on the reasoning that contribution is merely indemnity "on the
other foot." ' A sound conclusion on the deterrent effect of allowing or
77. Id.
78. 318 F. Supp. at 958. (citing Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1286 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)).
79. Easterbrook, Landes, & Posner, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 23 J. LAW & EcoN. 331, 349 (1980). But see Littman & Van Buskirk, The
"Dogmas" of Antitrust lActions: A New Perspective, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 687 (1979).
80. Easterbrook, note 79 supra, at 351. See also El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-
1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,533, at 71,112 (N.D. CaL April 28, 1976); Polinsky & Shavell, Contribu-
tion and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Anaosis, 33 STAN. L. REV.
447, 452-55 (1981). But see Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 558-59 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1766 (1982).
81. 318 F. Supp. at 958.
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denying contribution requires an extensive analysis that would include
an examination of the economic consequences of the decision. Judge
Frankel and subsequent judges have failed to do this. This failure is
understandable, because the nature of the issue requires an examina-
tion that courts are not well equipped to undertake. Nevertheless, no
court has cited any empirical data to support the conclusion that a rule
of contribution enhances, or for that matter, impedes deterrence. Like
the analogy rationale, the deterrence rationale supports contradictory
conclusions concerning the propriety of contribution.
E. The Fourth Rationale - Fairness.
Arguments of "fairness" are frequently raised in judicial decisions
and in the literature as a rationale favoring contribution.8 2 Prosser is
frequently cited as support:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which per-
mits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were
equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one
alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution, the
existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs whim or spite, or his
collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot free.8 3
Prosser was, however, expressly concerned with instances in which the
defendants were "unintentionally responsible." When the defendant
seeking fairness through contribution is himself guilty of more than
simple negligence, the fairness question takes on a different hue. Such a
tortfeasor either knowingly or recklessly was responsible for his predic-
ament and cannot make the strong case based on fairness available to a
merely negligent tortfeasor.8 4
Moreover, it may be unfair to permit a rule lOb-5 defendant to
seek contribution. The contribution aspects of a case might substan-
tially complicate an already complicated securities fraud case. The
original defendant would have to implead third-party defendants and
prove their culpability, thus delaying the plaintiff's case or causing con-
fusion among the members of the jury. If the court decides to adopt a
rule of comparative culpability in determining the portion of the judg-
ment each defendant must contribute, further complexity is added and
the cost of administering the securities laws increases. It may indeed be
82. See note 40 supra.
83. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, § 50 at 307 (citation omitted).
84. In its recent decision in Texas Industries, the Supreme Court reiterated the traditional
reason for denying contribution among intentional tortfeasors: "traditional equitable standards
have something to say about the septic state of the hands of such a suitor in the courts, and, in the
context of one wrong doer suing a co-conspirator, these standards similarly suggest that parties
generally inpari delicto should be left where they are found." 451 U.S. at 635.
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fairer to let the plaintiff control the litigation and choose the defendants
while denying the guilty defendants the right to seek contribution. Ad-
ditionally, a no-contribution rule would encourage settlement because
a settling defendant will have the assurance that his settlement with the
plaintiff terminates his involvement in the litigation and precludes non-
settling defendants from later bringing suit for contribution.8 5
Because the courts have used dubious rationales to support contri-
bution, and because a question may be raised in any event as to the
power or authority of the federal courts to order contribution, a rede-
termination of the issue is appropriate. A reasonable starting point for
such an undertaking is a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions on
contribution in contexts other than securities laws violations.
III. SUPREME COURT CASES ON CONTRIBUTION.
The Supreme Court has taken up the question of contribution in
three different settings. The Court's first case on contribution, which
pre-dated its decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,86 concerned the
availability of contribution in common law tort actions. Some time
later, in the course of exercising its appellate jurisdiction over admi-
ralty cases, the Court considered whether the right to contribution
should be judicially provided in noncollision tort actions arising in ad-
miralty.8 7 Finally, and most recently, the Court considered the appro-
priateness of finding a right to contribution when the underlying
liability is based on an express private cause of action in a federal
statute. 88
A. Contribution at Common Law.
Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
Railroad,8 9 decided in 1905, is the Supreme Court's only decision on
85. Cf. Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court in A/t-
man refused to approve a partial settlement in a class action brought under rule lob-5 because the
settlement contained a bar against the non-settling defendants seeking contribution from the set-
tling defendant. The court acknowledged, however, that its decision
may be read to cut athwart the policy consideration in favor of settlements of litigations,
including class actions. Indeed, from the point of view of the plaintiff and the class
which he represents in this case, it is at least theoretically possible that this ruling may
work a deprivation of their contemplated partial recovery now of a substantial amount
of money.
Id. at 625.
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974); Halcyon Lines v.
Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
88. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981); Northwest Airlines v. Trans-
port Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
89. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
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the availability of contribution at common law. The holding of the
case is not clear, but it appears that the Court recognized and left un-
disturbed the common law rule generally denying contribution among
joint tortfeasors. 90 Because the Union Stock Yards case was prior to
the Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,91 which gener-
ally prohibited federal courts from making federal common law, the
case appears to be of little precedential value today.92
It is possible, however, to apply common law precedents in a rule
lOb-5 action if one characterizes the action as a tort. The first case
finding a private right of action under rule lOb-5 adopted the tort the-
ory as the basis for its holding.93 If rule lOb-5 is indeed based in tort,
then it is at least arguable that common law remedies should apply,
including the common law precedents on contribution.
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has repeatedly de-
nied the existence of an implied private right of action in a federal stat-
ute under any theory other than congressional intent: it has required
that the statute in question clearly indicate that Congress intended the
federal courts to provide a private remedy.94 Although the Court has
acquiesced, apparently with some reluctance, in the implication of a
90. The Court framed the issue in the case as whether "the terminal company [may] recover
contribution, or more strictly speaking, indemnity from the railroad company because of the dam-
ages which it has been compelled to pay. . .?" 196 U.S. at 223. It is reasonable to conclude that
the Court was concerned only with indemnity, because the cases it cited as establishing an excep-
tion to the "general rule" denying contribution or indemnity were cases in which indemnity was
granted. Id. at 224-26. The Court's concern with the indemnity issue, as opposed to the availabil-
ity of contribution, can probably be attributed to the overwhelming common law precedent that,
at the time, denied contribution among joint tortfeasors. See W. PROSSER, supra note 38, § 50, at
306. Nevertheless, in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries the Court cited Union Stock Yards
as a case in which it had denied contribution at common law. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 634;
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 86 n.16.
91. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. If the Court should decide that the federal courts have limited common law rulemaking
authority when interpreting rule lOb-5, a common law precedent like Union Stock Yards may be
helpful in resolving the contribution question. See generally note 125 infra.
93. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
94. See notes 25 and 26 supra and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist identified this shift
in doctrine by contrasting the majority opinion in Cannon v. University ofChicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979) with the Court's earlier decision in J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964):
[Tihe approach of the Court, reflected in its analysis of the problem in this case [and
other recent decisions] is quite different from the analysis in earlier cases such as J.!
Case Co. v. Borak. The question of the existence of a private right of action is basically
one of statutory construction. And while state courts of general jurisdiction still enforc-
ing common law as well as statutory law may be less constrained than are federal courts
enforcing laws enacted by Congress, the latter must surely look to those laws to deter-
mine whether there was an intent to create a private right of action under them.
441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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private right of action under rule lOb-5, 95 it has not interpreted private
actions under rule lOb-5 as common law tort actions independently
from the remaining provisions of the securities laws. Instead, the Court
has sought to define the contours of rule lOb-5 actions in a manner
consistent with those other provisions.96 It would, therefore, be inap-
propriate to conclude that because a private right of action under rule
lOb-5 is, in its origins, a common law tort action, contribution should
be denied.97
B. Northwest Airlines and Texas Instruments: Recent Cases on
Implied Contribution.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the problem of implied
contribution in Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union98 and
Texas Industries v. RadcdtfMaterials, Inc. 99 The Court began its anal-
ysis in these cases by noting that a right to contribution can arise in
either of two ways: Congress may create the right, either expressly or
by implication, or the federal courts may fashion a federal common law
right of contribution. Because the statutes involved in these cases did
not expressly create a right of contribution, the Court looked to Cort v.
Ash100 and its progeny'01 to determine whether a right to contribution
should be inferred.
95. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19. Similarly, the Court has not
overruled its decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 327 U.S. 426 (1964), which found an implied cause
of action under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act on a theory other than congressional intent. See
notes 159-64 infra and accompanying text.
96. See text accompanying note 137 infra. Interpretation of § 10(b) and rule lob-5 without
regard to the statute from which they originated may also raise constitutional questions. Cf. Gins
v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248,259-68 (3d Cir.) (Sloviter, 3., dissenting) (pointing out constitu-
tional problems in finding an implied right to contribution in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 331 (1980).
97. The Supreme Court has also addressed the problem of implied contribution in cases aris-
ing under the Court's admiralty jurisdiction. In Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kapke, Inc., 417
U.S. 106 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a defendant shipowner may obtain contribution
from a third-party defendant stevedore, at least in cases where the plaintiff longshoremen could
have sued either tortfeasor. Subsequently, however, the Court expressly denied that Cooper Steve-
doring established a general federal right to contribution. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 96-
97. Because federal courts have unique power to fashion remedies in admiralty, it is doubtful that
any admiralty decision on contribution will apply directly in the federal securities laws context.
To the extent that the federal courts can exercise common law rulemaking authority to decide the
contribution question under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, they may, however, be influenced by
admiralty precedents. For instance, Cooper Stevedoring permitted contribution in favor of a party
guilty of simple negligence, a result consistent with the trend in the state courts permitting contri-
bution among negligent tortfeasors. See notes 64-72 supra and accompanying text.
98. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
99. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
100. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In both Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries the Court noted that
lower federal courts had recognized an implied right to contribution under the federal securities
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In Cori, the Court set out four factors that should be considered in
determining whether a private cause of action is implied by federal
statute:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right
in favor of the plaintiff. Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legis-
lative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff. And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?t O°
In subsequent opinions the Court has emphasized that when the ques-
tion is whether a private cause of action should be inferred from a fed-
eral statute, the inquiry must focus on whether Congress intended to
create the private remedy asserted. The Cort factors are to be used
only insofar as they aid in determining legislative intent. 0 3 In one of
its more recent cases on implied rights of action, '04 the Court indicated
that the third and fourth Cori factors are relevant only if an examina-
tion of the first two factors indicates a congressional intent to create the
remedy. 105
Using these cases as precedent, the Court examined the relevant
legislation in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines to determine if a
right to contribution was implicitly created. In Texas Industries, which
arose under the federal antitrust laws, the Court first noted that there
was nothing in the legislative history of the Sherman Act or the Clay-
ton Act to indicate that Congress had considered whether contribution
should be available to defendants in antitrust actions.106 The Court
law, but intimated no view as to the correctness of those decisions. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at
640 n. 11; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 n.24.
101. Cort's progeny are, by now, numerous. In Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries the
Court relied primarily on its four most recent decisions: California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287
(1981); Universities Research Ass'n. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advi-
sors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); and Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
102. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
103. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 23-24 (1979),
104. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
105. Id. at 298 ("factors are only of relevance if the first two factors give indication of congres-
sional intent to create the remedy"). Logically, the Cort analysis should begin with an examina-
tion of the second factor, which asks whether there is any indication of legislative intent to create
or deny a remedy. Any indication one way or another should preclude an examination of the
other factors. Justice Rehnquist wrote a concurring opinion, which was joined by three other
justices, to emphasize the preeminence of the second factor and the relative unimportance of the
remaining Cort factors. Id at 302. Presumably, these factors are relevant in discerning legislative
intent when an examination of the statutory language, the scheme of the legislation and its legisla-
tive history indicate that Congress may have intended to create a private cause of action.
106. 451 U.S. at 639.
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then found that the antitrust laws "were not adopted for the benefit of
the participants in a conspiracy to restrain trade."'10 7 Thus, the Court
concluded that "[t]he absence of any reference to contribution in the
legislative history or of any possibility that Congress was concerned
with softening the blow on joint wrongdoers in this setting makes ex-
amination of [the] other factors [in Cort v. Ash] unnecessary."'' 08 Using
a similar analysis in Northwest Airlines, the Court concluded that Con-
gress did not intend to create a right of contribution in favor of employ-
ers against unions under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.109
After concluding that Congress did not intend to imply a right of
contribution in these laws, the Court considered the question of
whether a right to contribution could be judicially provided under prin-
ciples of federal common law. In its analysis, the Court was unequivo-
cal: the power of the federal courts to fashion federal law in the
common-law tradition is very limited and
absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive
rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow ar-
eas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United
States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflict-
ing rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admi-
ralty cases.' 10
Because neither case fell within one of those narrow categories, the
Court refused to provide a federal common law a right to contribution.
IV. Applying Analysis to Rule lob-5.
While the decisions in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines ap-
pear to provide a framework for analyzing the question of contribution
under rule lOb-5, it is important to note the critical difference between
those cases and cases brought under rule 1Ob-5 insofar as determining
the relevance of legislative intent. In the former cases, the Court could
quite legitimately look at legislative history and other factors in order
to decide whether Congress intended for the courts to provide a right to
contribution in enforcing the antitrust laws. A parallel inquiry under
rule lOb-5 would be inapposite, however, because the courts have cre-
ated the plaintiffs cause of action under rule 1Ob-5, based on factors
other than implication on congressional intent."I It is therefore illogi-
cal to ask whether Congress ever intended the courts to infer a right to
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 451 U.S. at 94.
110. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
111. See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
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contribution under section 10(b); because it has never been demon-
strated that Congress ever intended the courts to sanction a private
cause of action in the first instance.
Even though actions under section 10(b) are not based on legisla-
tive intent, it is useful to examine the securities laws to determine if
there is some clear legislative policy favoring contribution. If there is
such a policy, one might legitimately argue that the policy should con-
trol in the implied actions because in implied actions the courts should,
to the extent possible, fashion those rules that Congress would have
adopted if it had created an express cause of action. 12 It is also useful
to examine whether, even in the absence of such a showing of legisla-
tive policy, the courts have the authority to impose a rule of contribu-
tion. In interpreting an implied cause of action, the courts by necessity
arrogate some lawmaking authority to themselves. The question is, of
course, what limitations, if any, there are on this lawmaking authority.
This latter question will be explored after a review of the legislative
policy of the securities laws.
A. Legislative Policy.
A clear legislative policy favoring contribution does not emerge
from examination of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Because
the controlling person provisions omit a right to contribution while
other express liability provisions include the right, it is questionable
whether Congress would have included a right to contribution had it
created an express right of action under section 10(b). Where Congress
wanted a particular rule to apply to all private damage actions, it
placed that rule in a separate section, as it did with the controlling per-
son provisions. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, for instance, pro-
vides that every person who controls any person liable "under any
provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder" is jointly
and severally liable with such controlled person (unless the good faith
defense in the statute applies)." 3 Similarly, the provisions of sections
29(b)" 4 and 32(a)" 5 of the Exchange Act, which relate to the
voidability of contracts and criminal penalties respectively, apply to all
sections of that Act and the rules and regulations thereunder. By plac-
112. The goal would seem to be guessing what Congress "would have intended on a point not
present to its mind, if the point had been present." GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE
LAW 173 (1963 ed.), quoted in Friendly, In Praise of Erie and of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 383, 410 (1964).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78ce (1976).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
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ing a right to contribution in some sections and not others, Congress
may have intended to limit the right to contribution to those instances
where it was specifically provided. "16
Approaching the issue by applying a Cort v. Ash analysis yields
unclear results. The first factor, whether the defendant is a member of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, on its face
argues against providing contribution. The rule lOb-5 defendant finds
himself in the same position as the antitrust conspirator in Texas Indus-
tries: "'a member of a class whose activities Congress intended to reg-
ulate for the protection and benefit of an entirely distinct class. . .... 7
The second Cort factor, focusing on the legislative history, is difficult to
apply. One can hardly expect the legislative history to indicate Con-
gress intended the federal courts to provide a right to contribution in
private actions based on rule lOb-5, since Congress could never have
contemplated the judicial creation of a private action based on a then
unwritten SEC rule.
The third Cort factor, whether contribution would be consistent
with the purpose of the securities laws, may be argued either way. On
the one hand, the purpose of the securities laws was to protect inves-
tors"I8 and thus parties guilty of violating the law ought not derive any
benefit from them. On the other hand, if contribution enhances deter-
rence, a rule favoring contribution would help protect investors and
thus be consistent with the securities laws.
The fourth factor, which requires an examination of whether the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law, may not apply
because the whole inquiry deals with what might be regarded as merely
an aspect of a federal cause of action. In the typical case using the Cort
factors, the court will compare the cause of action that it is being asked
to find with state law to see if state law provides relief for the injury
allegedly suffered by plaintiff. When the issue is whether a defendant
ought to have a right to contribution, however, an examination of state
law may not be meaningful because it is difficult to identify a distinct
state cause of action for contribution. On the other hand, if a defend-
116. Arguably, the omission of a right to contribution in the controlling person provisions was
an oversight on the part of the legislature that the courts should correct. However, establishing
that the omission was inadvertent is quite difficult and in any event, the courts are reluctant to
rewrite statutes. "If the omission was intentional, no court can supply it. If the omission was due
to inadvertence, an attempt to supply it. . .would be tantamount to adding to a statute a mean-
ing not intended by the Legislature." Mitchell v. Mitchell, 312 Mass. 154, 161, 43 N.E.2d 783, 787
(1942) (construing a Massachusetts statute dealing with the appointment of guardians). See also
FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1963).
117. 451 U.S. at 639 (emphasis added by Court in quoting from Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1, 37 (1977)).
118. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
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ant seeking contribution under rule l0b-5 can also allege that the per-
son from whom the defendant is seeking contribution breached some
common law duty to the defendant that resulted in the imposition of
liability under lOb-5, the defendant may be able to maintain a separate
cause of action against that person for indemnity under state law. 19 If
that is the case, then the fourth Cort factor would, if anything, indicate
that contribution ought not be provided as a federal remedy because a
state remedy exists.
Although the Court relied on the Cori v. Ash test in Texas Indus-
tries and Northwest Airlines, it may be inappropriate to apply Cort to
the question of contribution under the securities laws. In the typical
case using the Cort factors, the defendant has violated the statute in
question, harming the party seeking to establish a private cause of ac-
tion. In Cort, for instance, a shareholder attempted to bring a deriva-
tive action for damages a corporation suffered as a result of the
violation by the corporation's directors of 18 U.S.C. § 610, the criminal
statute prohibiting corporations from making campaign contributions
in connection with presidential elections. In fact situations similar to
Cort, it makes sense to ask whether the plaintiff is a member of the
class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. It makes no sense to
ask that same question in the context of the contribution issue because
the party seeking contribution is a wrongdoer and not an intended ben-
eficiary of the statute. 20 Unlike the plaintiff in Cort, the party seeking
contribution cannot argue injury resulting from a violation of a statute.
Applying the remaining factors is similarly questionable because con-
tribution is so collateral to the legislation that an analysis of the legisla-
tion, as suggested in Cort, is unlikely to provide any useful guidance.
Thus, a Cort analysis should not control the question of implied contri-
bution under the securities laws. Because the legislative policy is un-
119. Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 530 F.Supp. 1061 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401, Comment d (1958) ("Unless he has been authorized
to act in the manner in which he acts, the agent who subjects his principal to liability because of a
negligent or other wrongful act is subject to liability to the principal for the loss which results
therefrom."); Behar v. Savard, 21 F.R.D. 367, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Stawasz v. Aetna Insur.
Co., 99 Ill. App. 2d 131, 240 N.E.2d 702 (1968).
120. Recognizing an implied cause of action on behalf of someone other than the "intended
beneficiary" may benefit the intended beneficiary. In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d
366 (6th Cir. 1981), the court recognized an implied cause of action for injunctive relief under
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act on behalf of a tender offeror, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's earlier ruling in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), which denied standing
to a tender offeror seeking money damages from the target company under section 14(e). The
court in Mobil reasoned that allowing the tender offeror to seek injunctive relief would enhance
the protection of investors afforded by the Williams Act in a way that an action for money dam-
ages could not.
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clear, the issue becomes whether the federal courts have thepower to
provide a right to contribution, and if so, whether they should exercise
it. These questions turn on the power of the federal courts to "make"
common law.
B. Federal Common Law.
In Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines the Court rejected the
notion that it was appropriate for it to create a right to contribution as a
matter of federal common law because those cases did not fall within
one of the narrow categories specified by the Court. If the Court ap-
plied a similar analysis to determine whether the federal courts should
invoke federal common law to create a right to contribution under the
securities laws, it would reach the same conclusion. When construing
the federal securities laws the federal courts are not operating in an
area of "unique federal concern" as the Court views that concept be-
cause "unique federal concerns" are limited to cases such as those im-
plicating the rights or duties of the United States or the resolution of
interstate controversies. 121 Aside from those cases, the Court has lim-
ited federal court freedom in making common law to admiralty, where
there is Constitutional authority for lawmaking by the federal judici-
ary,122 and labor law, where Congress has vested jurisdiction in the
federal courts and empowered them to create governing rules of law.
123
To the extent that creating a right to contribution in a securities case is
an act of judicial lawmaking, it does not appear to have been specifi-
cally authorized by the Supreme Court. Because the courts have pro-
vided a private right of action under section 10(b), however, the courts
must fix the contours of that action in a way necessarily involving an
element of lawmaking. 124 The courts must determine the elements of
121. Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95. At least one court considering the scope of the com-
mon law since Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries has read "unique federal interests" more
broadly. In Barany v. Buller, 640 F.2d 726, 735 (7th Cir. 1982), the court held that the federal
interest in federally chartered credit unions was sufficient to justify the court's decision finding an
implied federal quo warranto remedy on behalf of two ousted members of the credit union's credit
committee.
122. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 vests jurisdiction over admiralty and martime cases in the fed-
eral courts. Congress has largely left to the federal courts the task of fashioning the controlling
rules of admiralty law. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 21 (1962).
123. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
124. In this regard, the federal courts are acting much as they do in the labor law area. While
Congress has not expressly empowered the federal courts to make governing rules of law in im-
plied private actions under the securities laws, as a practical matter that is just what the federal
courts are doing. The Supreme Court cannot continue to recognize implied private actions under
sections 10(b) and 14(a) without, at the same time, recognizing that the federal courts are making
federal common law. Consider, in this regard, Judge Posner's reflection on Heizer Corp. v. Ross,
601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979), which recognized a right to contribution in rule lOb-5 actions:
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the cause of action, appropriate defenses, and, by necessity, the availa-
bility of contribution. 25 When engaging in this function, the federal
courts have not, or at least should not have, proceeded as common law
courts construing a common-law, as opposed to a statute-based cause
of action. Rather, the federal courts are bound by the congressional
policies embodied in the securities acts. Only when a policy is not dis-
cernable or is ambiguous should the courts proceed in a common law
tradition in fixing the contours of an implied cause of action.' 26 The
Court has not yet had an occasion to rule on outer limits of the federal
judiciary's authority when construing an implied cause of action.
In private actions based on rule lOb-5 the Court has begun by ex-
amining the language of section 10(b) as an indication of how private
actions should be implemented. 27 The Court has then compared and
contrasted section 10(b) to the express liability provisions of the securi-
ties laws, with a view to reading the various sections in harmony. 28
The Court has seemed particularly concerned with avoiding a result
"Heizer shows, incidentally, that creating federal common law to decide the liabilities inter se of
violators of the federal securities laws is not out of the question; Heizer was a federal common law
case." Cenco, Inc. v. Seidman, [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,615, at
93,057 (7th Cir. 1982).
125. The dictum in Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines specifying the limited areas of
federal common law recognized by the Court ought not to be read as limiting the discretion of the
federal courts in fixing the contours of private actions under rule lob-5 and specifically deciding
whether to allow contribution. In both cases the Court reserved judgment on the appropriateness
of permitting contribution under federal securities laws. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91
n.24; Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 640 n.l . The implied contribution question under the securities
laws is clearly distinguishable from the contribution question faced by the Court in Texas Indus-
tries and Northwest Airlines. In each of those cases the Court was persuaded that the statutes in
question "were detailed and specific", Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 644, and "comprehensive"
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 97, and, therefore, it was "improper" to add a right to contribution
to the statutory rights Congress created. Rather, if there was to be a right to contribution, it would
have to come from Congress. By contrast, Congress created no statutory rights under section
10(b) or 14(a) for private plaintiffs and the federal courts should not defer to Congress for a
determination of the contribution question. Such deference would mean that while the federal
courts may create a cause of action against a group of defendants, it must defer to Congress to
decide if any judgments under that cause of action are to be shared by the defendants. In short, it
is too late for the federal courts to defer to Congress as to the elements of a private cause of action
under rule 1Ob-5 and §14(a). Rather, if the Court is going to continue to recognize private actions
under these provisions, the federal courts must give shape to those actions by applying sound
common law principles. Since federal common law applies to these judicially created actions, the
federal courts should have the power to permit a right to contribution. As the Supreme Court
recognized in Texas Industries: "In areas where the federal common law applies, the creation of a
right to contribution may fall within the power of the federal courts." 451 U.S. at 641.
126. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional common-law technique
of decision and to draw upon all sources of the common law in cases such as the present.")
127. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1975).
128. Id. at 205-11.
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that would grant plaintiffs greater rights under an implied action than
they would have if limited to one of the express liability provisions.129
Finally, the Court has looked beyond the statutes to the implications of
its decisions in various contexts. 130 Blue Chio Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,13' the first major lOb-5 case of the Burger Court, typifies the
mode of analysis employed by the Court.
In Blue Chp Stamps, the issue was whether offerees of a stock of-
fering who did not purchase shares might nevertheless maintain an ac-
tion under rule l0b-5. The Court was thus called upon to review the
rule denying standing to nonpurchasers first established by the Second
Circuit in 1952 in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.13 2 The Court held
that plaintiffs could not maintain the suit, reasoning first that the word-
ing of section 10(b) "which is directed towards injury suffered 'in con-
nection with the purchase or sale' of securities, argues significantly in
favor of acceptance of the Birnbaum rule by this Court.' 33 The Court
then contrasted the language of section 10(b) to that of section 17(a) of
the Securities Act, which prohibits fraud "in the offer or sale" of securi-
ties, to demonstrate that Congress was aware that a fraud could occur
in the offer of securities and that appropriate language could have been
used if Congress wanted to cover such fraud. 134 The Court also re-
ferred to section 16(b) of the Exchange Act and concluded that "[w]hen
Congress wished to provide a remedy to those who neither purchase
nor sell securities, it had little trouble in doing so expressly."' 35 Fur-
ther, the Court noted that the express liability provisions of the securi-
ties laws are limited to purchasers and sellers of securities. The Court
felt that it would be anomalous for Congress to expand the plaintiff
class for a judicially created cause of action beyond the bounds that it
had set for comparable express actions.136
The Court recognized, however, that its analysis had not gone far
enough, because it could not divine from the language of section 10(b)
the "express 'intent of Congress' as to the contours of a private cause of
129. In Hochfelder, for instance, the Court refused to read section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
as reaching negligent wrongdoing, because doing so "would allow causes of action covered by
§§ 11, 12(2) and 15 [of the Securities Act] to be brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify
the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions." Id. at
210 (footnote omitted).
130. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1974).
131. 421 U.S. 723 (1974).
132. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
133. 421 U.S. at 733.
134. Id. at 734-35.
135. Id. at 735.
136. Id. at 736.
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action under rule lOb-5. ' 137 It was thus proper, the Court said, to
weigh "what may be described as policy considerations" in deciding
the case. 138 The Court went on to decide that such considerations sup-
ported adoption of the Birnbaum rule, because, among other things, the
failure to adopt that rule would make it too easy to bring an action
under rule lOb-5 and present real danger of vexatious litigation.139
In the case of contribution, however, nothing in the language of
section 10(b) will aid the Court; because the section does not grant an
express cause of action, it is bereft of any mention of contribution. Ex-
amination of the other sections of the securities laws will, as noted
above, be inconclusive. 140 And while Blue Ch#p Stamps legitimizes an
inquiry into considerations beyond statutory interpretation, that opin-
ion is not as broad as it seems because the Court was merely determin-
ing the scope of section 10(b) in terms of who had standing to bring suit
under the section. The Court did not need to go beyond the section
and find a second cause of action as it would if it were asked to provide
a right to contribution. In fact, none of the rule lOb-5 cases thus far
decided by the Court have required it to go beyond the language of
section 10(b) in the same sense that a contribution case would. The
lower courts have, on occasion, decided these "peripheral" issues in
which the language of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5 was irrelevant. The
availability of punitive damages as part of the remedy under rule lOb-
5141 or the obligation of a party to post security for expenses 142 under
rule lOb-5 are two examples of peripheral issues where the scope of
judicial authority in lOb-5 actions became a factor. These decisions
demonstrate an uncertainty on the limitation of judicial authority in
implied actions that is absent from virtually all of the contribution
cases.
In the area of punitive damages the lower courts have been nearly
unanimous in deciding that a plaintiff may not obtain punitive dam-
137. Id. at 737.
138. Id;
139. Id. at 736-49. In Texas Industries, by comparison, the Court would not consider the
policies favoring and opposing contribution in antitrust cases because, the Court decided, this was
a matter for Congress, not the courts. 451 U.S. at 646. Thus, the Court implicitly recognized in
Blue Chip Stamps that fixing the contours of the implied cause of action under section 10(b) may
require the federal courts to engage, at least to a certain extent, in the common law technique of
fashioning rules.
140. See notes 54-64 and 113-116 supra and accompanying text.
141. See cases cited at note 143 infra.
142. See, eg., McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
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ages in an action based on rule lOb-5.143 The decisions have not, how-
ever, turned on whether the federal courts have the power to read
punitive damages into section 10(b), as the analysis employed by the
Tenth Circuit in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co. 144 demonstrates. In
deHaas, a typical case, the court first noted that section 28(a) of the
Exchange Act, which limits recovery under that Act to "actual dam-
ages,"1 45 does not dispose of the question because this section may refer
only to actions expressly created by the Act and not to implied ac-
tions. 146 The court then looked to the legislative history of section
28(a), but found no guidance in resolving the problem before it.147 Fi-
nally, the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the benefits and
detriments of allowing a right to punitive damages in section 10(b) and
concluded, on balance, that policy considerations weighed against al-
lowing recovery of punitive damages. 148 At no point did the court
question its authority to allow punitive damages if policy considera-
tions favored such a result.
In contrast, the few cases which have discussed whether the plain-
tiff in a rule lOb-5 action might be required to post security for ex-
penses demonstrate a concern with the limitations on judicial authority.
In .Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co. ,149 for instance, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the trial court had no au-
thority to order a bond to cover expenses. A subsequent decision in the
third circuit, McClure v. Borne Chemical Co. 150 discussed the issue at
greater length. In responding to the argument that the court should
impose a security for expense provision where the private remedy is
implied because security for expense provisions are part of the provi-
sions in which private rights of action have been granted explicitly, the
court said:
This argument is, of course, tenable only where the statute evinces a
clear policy in favor of security for expenses limitations. Even then,
143. See, e.g., deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). Green and deHaas are the
two leading cases on the subject. See also, 5B JACOBS, supra note 42, § 2603[e], at 11-106 n.1,
collecting numerous cases.
144. 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976) ("[N]o person permitted to maintain a suit for damages under
the provisions of this chapter shall recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more ac-
tions, a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account of the act complained of.")
146. 435 F.2d at 1230.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1231-32. Cf. Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969)
(employing a similar policy analysis in concluding that punitive damages are not available in an
action based on section 17(a) of the Securities Act.)
149. 188 F.2d 783, 788-89 (2d Cir. 1951).
150. 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961).
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we believe, there would be a serious question whether a court, in the
proper exercise of its judicial function, could carry the traditional tort
doctrine of implication of private remedies to such a length. 151
The court did not have to resolve this question because it decided that
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act do not manifest a sufficiently
clear or uniform policy favoring security for expenses to allow the court
to impose such a limitation as a part of section 10(b).152
The concern over judicial authority expressed by the courts in
Fischman and McClure should not be a factor in the contribution ques-
tion for two reasons. First, the conclusion reached by those courts
should not be read too broadly. The courts did not identify the point at
which their authority to fashion rules to implement rule lOb-5 ceases.
Because of the nature of an action based on rule lOb-5, the federal
courts must be free to apply traditional common law techniques in
fixing its contours when the legislative policy is unclear. Second, even
if the courts in Fischman and McClure were correct in their assessment
of judicial authority, the question of whether to allow contribution can
be distinguished from the question of whether plaintiff can be required
to post a bond for expenses. The latter is generally based on some pro-
vision of a statute or rule of court.153 By comparison, courts exercising
common law powers have ordered joint tortfeasors to pay contribution,
at least where the tortfeasors were guilty of negligence. Moreover, the
common law courts that have rejected adoption of a common law rule
favoring contribution have done so either because they perceived con-
tribution as contrary to public policy or because precedent so required,
not because they felt that they lacked the authority to adopt such a
rule.154 Thus, while there may be some limits on the power of federal
courts in deciding peripheral issues under rule lOb-5, the availability of
contribution would not appear to be one of them.
C. The Case for Denying Contribution Under Rule 10b-5.
A rather simple conclusion results from the foregoing analysis: the
federal courts have the authority to adopt a federal rule of contribution
in private actions based on rule lOb-5, but the rationales offered to sup-
port a rule of contribution are not compelling. The courts should reex-
amine the policies underlying contribution to determine whether the
existence of such a right would deter future violations of rule 1Ob-5 and
to determine whether considerations of fairness require the adoption of
151. Id. at 836.
152. Id. at 837. See also L. Loss, supra note 32, at 1842.
153. Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 34 F.RtD. 8, 12 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
154. See generally cases cited in Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1965).
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such a rule. Although courts have uniformly offered deterrence as a
rationale for allowing contribution, thoughtful contemporary analysis
indicates that a rule denying contribution in rule lOb-5 actions may
actually operate as a greater deterrent than a rule permitting contribu-
tion. 155 Moreover, the nature of a rule lOb-5 action, requiring as it
does proof that the defendant acted with scienter, suggests that it is not
unfair to deny contribution in such actions. In short, in the absence of
persuasive evidence demonstrating that a rule favoring contribution
would further deterrence, the wiser approach seems to be to opt for the
traditional common law rule which denies contribution among
tortfeasors who acted intentionally or recklessly. Because an inten-
tional or reckless violation of lOb-5 apparently satisfies the scienter re-
quired by that rule, contribution should be denied under a uniform
federal rule. 156
155. See notes 76-81 supra and accompanying text.
156. The foregoing analysis assumes that the federal courts would adopt a uniform federal
rule regarding contribution, as they have in the past. In fact, even this aspect of past practice is
subject to reexamination because it ignores the possible role that state law should play in resolving
the issue. See generally T. Fiflis, Choice of Federal or State LawforAttorneys'ProfessionalRespon-
sibility, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1236 (1981); Comment, 4dopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Deci-
sion" .4 Proposed Test, 43 U. CHi. L. REV. 823 (1970). While Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) clearly does not apply because the interpretation and implementation of the federal securi-
ties laws is a federal question requiring the application of federal law. Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 557 (5th Cir. 1981); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir.
1979). See also 5B A. JACOBS, supra note 42, §264.02[c], at 11-328. The federal courts may still
look to state law for the applicable federal rule of decision when a federal statute is silent on a
particular question. Indeed, some recent decisions suggest that the Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. §1652 (1976), not only requires the use of state law in diversity cases, but also in non-
diversity cases where the federal statute contains a gap and Congress did not specify a choice of
law. See T. FiFps, supra at 1257. In any event, the importance of uniformity as a ground for
ignoring state law in fashioning a federal rule, a consideration so prevalent in the Court's 1943
decision of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (see T. FiFLIS, supra, at
1257), is clearly not controlling when there is little need for a nationally uniform body of law.
United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). In cases where the need for uni-
formity is not paramount, the Court has weighed the federal and state interests involved, with a
view towards accommodating important state interests as a necessary incident to federalism. See,
e.g., United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S.
25, 28-29 (1977). Professor Fiflis has succinctly described this process of accommodation:
When the federal interests underlying federal law would be totally defeated by observing
the state interest through adoption of the state rule, the federal interests will be given
supremacy and a uniform federal rule will be announced. If no direct conflict exists, a
court must then determine whether the federal interests, including any interest in main-
taining a uniform rule to effectuate underlying federal policies, compete with identified
state interests, in the sense that adoption of the state rule would partially hinder the full
implementation of the federal interest. If this lesser conflict is found to exist, the court
must measure the relative strengths of the federal and state interests to determine
whether adoption of the state rule or determination of a uniform federal rule would yield
the maximum satisfaction of all interests. In the event that federal interests do not com-
pete with the state interests, the state rule should be adopted.
T. FiFLIS, supra at 1269-70 (footnotes omitted). A resolution of the several questions suggested by
the above analysis is beyond the scope of this article; however, should the courts decide that the
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V. IMPLIED CONTRIBUTION UNDER OTHER SECTIONS OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS
A. The Other Implied Liability Provisions.
While the federal courts have, from time to time, found implied
private rights of action under various provisions and rules of the Secur-
ities Act and the Exchange Act,157 the Supreme Court has expressly
approved of implied private rights of action under only two provisions:
sections 10(b) and 14(a) 15s of the Exchange Act. The latter was at issue
in J Case Co. v. Borak,159 a case that pre-dates Cort and stands in
sharp contrast to it. Unlike Cort and its progeny, the Borak decision
was not based on congressional intent, but rather was justified on a
theory of a need for private enforcement to supplement the work of the
SEC and thereby add a deterrent for potential violators.16 0 The Court
has abandoned this rationale in subsequent decisions. t61 Moreover,
while it is unlikely that the Court will overrule its decision in Borak, 162
it is clear that the court is moving cautiously in this area and has shown
a reluctance to infer a private right of action for damages under other
provisions of the federal securities laws.' 63 In any event, an analysis of
federal courts have the authority to recognize a right to contribution under the federal securities
laws, they should address the adoption issue.
157. For a recent collection of sections and rules of the federal securities laws that have gener-
ated implied private rights of action, see ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722 (Comment (1)) (Proposed
Official Draft 1978).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
159. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
160. Id. at 432 ("Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to
Commission action.").
161. See, Frankel, supra note 25, at 559-63.
162. See, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 (1979) ("We do not now ques-
tion the actual holding of [Borak] ... ").
163. See, Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) the Court held that a defeated tender offeror
did not have standing to seek money damages under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act. The
Court left open the possibility that the shareholder-offerees or the target company would have
standing. 430 U.S. at 42, n.28. The lower federal courts have consistently held that the former do
have standing. See, eg., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 419
U.S. 873 (1974); O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Hurwitz v. R.B. Jones Corp., 76 F.R.D. 149 (W.D. Mo. 1977); McCloskey v. Epko Shoes,
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1975); and Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F.Supp.
890 (D. Me. 1971). Justice Stevens, dissenting in Piper, observed: "No one seriously questions the
premise that Congress implicitly created a private right of action when it enacted §14(e) in 1968."
430 U.S. at 55. See also ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1722 (Comment (2)) (Proposed Official Draft
1978) ("The negative Supreme Court holdings [in cases seeking implied private rights of action
under the securities laws and other federal statutes] throw grave doubt on the continued viability
of any of these lower court holdings [finding an implied private right of action under various
provisions and rules of the securities law]. The Court, in effect, has grandfathered its own affirma-
IMPLIED CONTRIBUTION
the contribution question as it applies to section 14(a) and rule lOb-5 is
applicable to the availability of contribution under other implied liabil-
ity provisions of the federal securities laws. 64
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to adopt
rules and regulations governing the solicitation of proxies for registered
securities. 165 The SEC's rule 14a-9(a), which was at issue in Borak,
prohibits the use of false or misleading statements in proxy solicita-
tions.166 Unlike rule lOb-5, which requires proof that the defendant
acted with scienter, liability has been imposed under rule 14a-9(a)
when the defendant acted only negligently.167 This should be an im-
portant consideration for courts if they adopt a uniform rule on contri-
bution under rule 14a-9(a): a defendant guilty of negligence should be
able to obtain contribution from another who violated the rule because
the principle of fairness that supports allowing contribution is most
compelling when the party seeking contribution was merely negligent.
Because of considerations of fairness and because permitting contribu-
tion may reduce deterrence, a defendant who acted with a scienter
should be precluded from obtaining contribution from others, at least
from parties who were only negligent.' 68 Such a rule of contribution
would be consistent with the uniform rule proposed above for actions
based on rule lOb-5 and with the statutory rule of contribution in sec-
tion 11 of the Securities Act. It is appropriate to look to section 11 for
guidance, moreover, because the operative language of rule 14a-9(a)
prohibiting the use of a false or misleading proxy solicitation is similar
to the operative language of section 1 (a).' 69 Furthermore, both provi-
sions have a similar purpose: to protect investors from damage that
tive holdings with respect to Rule lOb-5 and § 14(a).") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
But see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825 (1982) (five to four
decision where the Court recognized a private cause of action for damages under the Commodity
Exchange Act). See also Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding an implied cause
of action under the Investment Advisors Act.)
164. See note 170 infra.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1980).
167. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1976); Gerstle v.
Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1298-1301 (2d Cir. 1973). Butsee Adams v. Standard Knit-
ting Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 442 (6th Cir.), cent. denied, 449 U.S. 1067 (1980) (scienter should be an
element of liability in private suits under the proxy rules as they apply to outside accountants).
168. See notes 79, 80, 84 supra and accompanying text and note 156 su~pra.
169. Section 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), provides, in relevant part: "In case any part of registra-
tion statement ... contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading."
Similarly, rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-9 (1980), provides:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy state-
ment.., or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, at
the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or mislead-
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might result from making an investment decision (section 11 (a)) or a
voting decision (section 14(a)) on the basis of false or misleading
information.170
B. The Express Liability Provisions.
For purposes of the present inquiry, the five express liability provi-
sions of the securities laws that do not include a right to contribution
are divisible into two categories: those provisions that originally con-
templated multiple defendants and those that probably did not. The
former category includes the controlling person provisions of each Act,
while the latter includes sections 12(1) and 12(2) of the Securities Act
and section 16(b) of the Exchange Act. The Northwest Airlines and
Texas Instruments decisions may well have decided the contribution
issue as it applies to the controlling person provisions. The Court held
in those cases that the federal courts should not provide a right to con-
tribution as a part of federal laws that include detailed and specific
remedial provisions, at least where there is no indication that Congress
intended a right to contribution. It would be difficult to argue that
Congress intended that the courts provide a right to contribution in the
controlling person provisions because Congress expressly provided that
right in several other sections but omitted it there.' 7' The absence of a
right to contribution in the controlling persons provision can mean
only that Congress did not intend such a right or that it was over-
looked. In either case, the courts should deny the right, because, if the
former is true, the courts are bound by congressional intent, and, if the
latter is the case, the courts should look to Congress to correct the
oversight.172
ing with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary
in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.
170. The analysis of contribution under rule 10b-5 and section (14a) is applicable to other
implied liability provisions. For instance, if the courts have correctly recognized an implied pri-
vate cause of action for shareholder-offerees under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, see note 163,
supra, the availability of contribution under section 14(e) should be analyzed in the same fashion
as under rule lOb-5. The courts have noted that the two provisions (section 14(e) and rule 10b.5)
are nearly identical, except for the "in connection with" language and, therefore, the two provi-
sions would be construed inparimateria. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 658 (1981). The courts have noted that scienter is a necessary element
to a violation of section 14(e). See e.g., Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278 (9th
Cir. 1982). Thus, contribution ought not be available under section 14(e).
171. See Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 n.24 ("[When Congress wanted to provide a right
to contribution, it did so expressly.")
172. See note 116 supra. If the federal courts determine that they lack the authority to formu-
late a right to contribution under the controlling person provisions, state law on the subject should
continue to operate, as there is no apparent preemption problem. Section 28 of the Exchange Act,
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The decisions in Northwest Airlines and Texas Instruments do not
appear to prohibit contribution in those express liability provisions that
probably did not contemplate multiple defendants. For those provi-
sions, it cannot be said that Congress intended to deny a right to contri-
bution.1 73 Because the judicial determination that multiple defendants
may be found liable under section 12 is akin to the recognition of an
implied cause of action against those additional defendants who do not
fall within the narrow definition of a "seller," courts should have the
power to allow contribution among such defendants. If a uniform rule
is adopted, contribution actions should be prohibited for violators who
acted with scienter but allowed for these who were merely negligent.
The only other express liability provision which does not contain a
right of contribution is section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, prohibiting
insiders from retaining their short-swing profits. As discussed above,
no court has found multiple defendants liable under this section and,
therefore, the contribution question is unlikely to arise. Moreover, if a
section 16(b) defendant were able to obtain contribution he would not
be relinquishing the full amount of his profits, a result inconsistent with
the policy of section 16(b).
V. CONCLUSION
The long-standing rule allowing contribution in actions brought
under rule lOb-5 and other sections of the securities laws that do not
expressly provide for contribution does not rest on sound analysis. Pri-
vate actions based on rule lOb-5 are not congressionally mandated, and
it can hardly be maintained that Congress intended that the courts al-
low contribution in such actions. Further, the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act do not unambiguously favor contribution, so logic does not
dictate the implication of a right to contribution where it is not other-
wise provided. Federal courts do have the judicial power to allow a
right to contribution, at least under rule lOb-5 and section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act, and probably under section 12 of the Securities Act.
This power should be exercised cautiously, however, because allowing
contribution might affect the deterrence function of the securities laws
and might be unfair to plaintiffs. The fairness argument raised by de-
15 U.S.C. § 78bb (1976), provides in part: "The rights and remedies provided by this chapter shall
be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity .... "
173. The decisions holding that multiple parties may be liable for violations of section 12 of
the Securities Act have been criticized. See D. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REv. 80, 109-10 (1981).
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fendants seeking contribution can best be satisfied by permitting contri-
bution on behalf of a defendant who negligently violated the securities
laws, but denying that right to violators who acted with scienter.
